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In this article, we investigate the role of the Copperbelt in the world 
market of nonferrous metals. The analysed data were collected from the 
producing companies in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Zambia 
during field research in Africa. We found that the Copperbelt produced a 
median of 50% of the world’s cobalt, 12% of copper, 3.2% of zinc, 1.8% of 
cadmium, and 0.6% of lead. The results show that the market of cobalt is 
highly concentrated; DRC, the leading producer and reserve holder, 
accounts for a half of world production. During the same period, Chile and 
Peru produced 13% and 3% of the world’s copper, respectively. Also, 
mineral exploitation in African countries is usually a competition on two 
fronts: international and domestic. Nationalization policies in the 
Copperbelt region aim to achieve both political  and economic 
independence. The exports of metals from the Copperbelt plays a pivotal 
role in the world market. Since the early 2000s, China has invested 
extensively in the Copperbelt region to extract, process, and refine the 
metals to meet its domestic demand for metals.
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1  Introduction
The copper industry, as the principal sector, generates most of the 
revenue for the governments in Zambia and the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC1)). Historically, these two countries’ economies have been 
based on the exploitation of mineral resources (Campbell, 2009). Mineral 
supply and demand play a pivotal role in economic development, with 
economic growth always being accompanied by an increase of per capita 
metal use (Ignacio, Nishiyama, & Tilton, 2005). Minerals are needed to 
produce the equipment and devices that make our daily life comfortable, 
such as smartphones, personal computers, electronic appliances, and 
electric vehicles (Wiedmann, Schandl, & Moran, 2015); (Casper, 2007). 
Dependence on mineral refers to the mechanization process to produce 
large quantities of goods and services to meet an expanding population in 
modern society. 
The global known copper resources are estimated at 1,780.9 million tons, 
with the vast majority hosted as copper porphyry deposits that contain 
10-times more copper than any other mineral deposit type, especially in 
1) Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is the second largest country in Africa by land area. It 
was called the Independent State of Congo under the King Leopold II (1885-1908). It was 
renamed the Belgian Congo (1908-1960). After the independence in 1960 it became the 
Democratic Republic of Congo until 1967. President Mobutu Sese Seko changed the name to 
Zaïre between 1971 and 1997. President Laurent Desire Kabila recalled the former name of 
the Democratic Republic of Congo since 1997.
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Chile (Mudd, Weng, & Jowitt, 2013). The mineral resources of a country 
include its water resources and energy resources, such as coal, gas, 
petroleum, uranium, and geothermal energy (Deb & Sarkar, 2017); 
(Harris, Allen, & James, 1993); (Carr & Herz, 1989); (Govett & Govett, 
1974). The central African Copperbelt is one of the greatest sediment-
hosted stratiform copper and cobalt provinces on Earth, containing 140 
million tons of copper and 6 million tons of cobalt and other important 
deposits (Cailteux, Kampunzu, Lerouge, Kaputo, & Milesi, 2005). 
The discovery of precious metals has been a significant motive for 
settlement throughout the history of civilization (Skousen, 2007). In the 
Copperbelt, the mineralization is essentially a copper-cobalt ore that occurs 
mainly as three distinct types: sulfides, oxides, and migrating copper. The 
sulfides are found in the alteration zone below 70 m. In contrast to the 
sulfides ores extracted in underground mines, the oxides ores are found 
mainly in the zones close to the surface, allowing their extraction in open 
pits (Desouky, Muchez, & Cailteux, 2009). The grade of copper varies 
between 4 to 6% and usually remains uniformed in the same deposit. The 
high-grade ores are extracted first while low grade remains throughout the 
lifetime of a mine, so that the ore grade of copper decreases throughout the 
time of exploitation (Crowson, 2012). Production of cadmium has begun in 
1941 by the UMHK as a by-product of the preliminary roasting of zinc 
concentrates from the Kipushi mine to obtain sulfuric acid. Lead is the fifth 
most widely used metal in the world. Lead has various isotopes, some of 
which are the product of atomic decomposition of uranium or thorium. In 
the northern Katanga, the Kipushi deposit (Zn, Cu, Pb) is located in south-
eastern part of the Copperbelt of Katanga (Walraven & Chabu, 1994). The 
lead reserve in the DRC is not sufficient to justify economic exploitation. 
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Zambia has a significant deposit of lead reserve, and its exploitation is 
recorded in its archives. Cobalt is a bluish-grey, shiny, brittle metallic 
element (Taylor, 2009) and is a highly strategic, essential material for 
which no commercial substitutes have ever been found (Royen & Bowles, 
1952); (Rumbu, 2010), (Dill, 2010).
The extraction of minerals from the earth requires an effective 
combination of production factors–land, technology, capital, entrepreneurship, 
and a skilled labour force–to make the exploitation profitable (Sexton, 
2019). In the case of developing countries, especially in Zambia and the 
DRC, these factors are scarce. Generally, developing countries rely mainly 
on foreign investment in terms of capital, technology, and human expertise 
to develop mining projects. The local people in the DRC and Zambia 
extracted copper ore by traditional means to make a variety of instruments 
for hunting, war, and barter (Davis, 2010); (Hochschild, 1956); (Nyembo, 
1975). 
In recent decades, research addressing African business history has 
developed our understanding of some of the important research questions, 
such as the historical significance of African entrepreneurs; the spatial and 
temporary evolution of African business; its structure; and organization, 
management, and administration. Although the academic literature 
addressing African business has expanded, the recent past of African 
business has not yet been fully explored. More studies are needed to 
facilitate a better understanding of the varied past of African business 
(Jalloh, 2002). In this regard, this article attempts to answer the following 
research question: What role has extraction in the Central African 
Copperbelt2) played in the world market for nonferrous metals? There is 
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relatively less information available on the contribution of the Copperbelt to 
the world markets of metals.
The first section explains the background of the copper industry in 
Zambia and the DRC. The second section presents the analytical materials 
and methods. The third section presents the results. The fourth section 
discusses the local policies that influence the production of nonferrous 
metals in the Copperbelt in comparison with the international experience. 
The fifth section concludes the article.
2  Materials and method
This article analysed both the primary data and secondary sources, 
including archives of production companies, such as the Zambia 
Consolidated Copper Mining (ZCCM)3), the Union Minière du Haut-Katanga 
(UMHK)4), the Générale des Carrières et des Mines (Gecamines)5), and 
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2) Central African copperbelt (refers to as copperbelt) is a zone of copper deposits and 
associated mining and industrial development dependent upon them, forming the greatest 
concentration of industry in sub-Saharan Africa. The belt extends about 280 miles (450 km) 
northwest from Luansha in Zambia, into the Kowezi in Haut-Katanga province of the DRC. 
The zone is up to 160 miles (260 km) in width and contains more than a tenth of the world’s 
copper deposits and a third of the cobalt deposits, found mostly in Late Precambrian 
sedimentary deposits.
3) The Zambian Copper Consolidated Mines Limited (ZCCM) was created in 1982 as a result of 
the merger of two state mining enterprises which had themselves been created when the 
Zambian copper industry was nationalised in I969. The main shareholders of ZCCM included 
the Zambian government controlling 60% of the shares, and the South African conglomerate 
Anglo American Corporation (AAC) accounting for 27.3%. AAC held pre-emptive rights to 
purchase any shares sold by the government.
4) Union Minière du Haut-Katanga (UMHK) is the Belgian company founded in 1906 by Leopold 
II to extract copper metals in Katanga until the nationalization in 1967.
5) La Générale des Carrières et des Mines (Gecamines) is the government owned company 
created in 1967 after the nationalization of the Union Minière du Haut-Katanga.
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reports from the Ministries of Mines in the DRC and Zambia collected at 
their headquarters in Lubumbashi, Lusaka, and Ndola during the fieldwork.
This article relied on primary sources, including annual reports of 
companies by taking pictures, statistical data, and internal documents. 
During fieldwork trips in the DRC and Zambia, the authors interviewed the 
managers of the departments of research and development, production, and 
commercialization, as well as conducting interviews with miners who 
possessed a working experience of at least 25 years in the same company. 
These in-depth interviews were recorded and translated into English. The 
qualitative method was used to explain the neo-colonial policies in the 
copper industry based on the statements of living managers and miners.
The data relating to the demand and supply of nonferrous metals on the 
world market were retrieved from the database of the World Bank, and the 
statistical reports from the Chinese government. This data was analysed 
using the Stata® statistics Software, to estimate the statistics to evaluate 
the production and consumption trends of five nonferrous metals compared 
with the total world output. The historical prices of copper, cobalt, zinc, 
and cadmium were retrieved from the U.S. Geological Survey, with 1990 
used as the baseline year to estimate the constant revenues (Survey, 
2012). Figure 1 depicts the central African Copperbelt, where the principal 
mines and processing plants have been established.
The third section presents the results of output trends of five nonferrous 
metals, including copper, cobalt, zinc, cadmium, and lead. Lead is produced 
only in Zambia. The statistical summary of the five nonferrous metals is 
presented in Table 1.
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3   Results of distribution and production trends of nonferrous 
metals in the Copperbelt
This third section presents the trends of nonferrous metals output, 
focusing on the Copperbelt region.  The Copperbelt has produced 
considerable quantities of strategic metals for exports to the world market. 
The degree of economic development in the two countries allows only 
minimal local consumption of these metals because almost 90% of the 
output generates revenue through export to developed countries. Figure 2 
depicts the mine production of copper in tons in the Copperbelt region, 
including the DRC and Zambia from 1911 to 2015.
Figure 2 shows that Zambia was the largest producer of copper metal in 
Africa. Within the Copperbelt region, the DRC produced less copper metal 
Figure 1. The study area of the Central African Copperbelt. 
Source: Authors’drawing using the map from Kakanda Copper Mine 2007.
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Figure 2. Zambia and the DRC’s copper production in tons. 
Figure 3. Zambia and the DRC’s cobalt production in tons. 
Source: Authors’collation from the computation of data from annual reports of UMHK 1911–1966; 
Gecamines 1967–2016; ZCCM 1928–2015.
Source: Authors’collation from the computation of data from annual reports of UMHK 1911–1966; 
Gecamines 1967–2016; ZCCM 1928–2015.
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than Zambia. Figure 3 shows the trend of cobalt production in tons in the 
Copperbelt region from 1924 to 2015.
Figure 3 shows that the production of cobalt metal in the DRC was 
higher than in Zambia. Figure 4 shows the trends of cadmium output in tons 
in Zambia and the DRC.
Figure 4 shows that the production of cadmium as a by-product of copper 
metal was higher in the DRC than in Zambia. The output of cadmium in the 
Copperbelt region accounted for a relatively small quantity in comparison 
Figure 4. Zambia and the DRC’s cadmium production in tons. 
Source: Authors’collation from the computation of data from annual reports of UMHK 1911–1966; 
Gecamines 1967–2016; ZCCM 1928–2015; and the US geological database 1932–2016.
The economic impact of mining industries in the central African Copperbelt: Case study of Zambia and the Democratic Republic of Congo
10
with copper and cobalt metals. Figure 5 depicts the trend of zinc output in 
tons in the DRC and Zambia from 1933 to 1993.
Figure 5 shows that the quantity of zinc production in the Copperbelt 
region remained low throughout the period under study. Figure 6 shows 
the trends of lead output in the Copperbelt, especially in Zambia. 
Figure 6 shows that lead is produced only in Zambia, with no significant 
Figure 5. Zambia and the DRC’s zinc production in tons. 
Source: Authors’collation from the computation of data from annual reports of UMHK 1911-1966; 
Gecamines 1967–2016; ZCCM 1928–2015, and USG database 1933–2016.
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lead production by the DRC. 
Table 1 shows that Zambia and the DRC have been the dominant 
producers of cobalt metal and copper metal in Africa since the colonial era. 
The fourth section will discuss the factors that influence the trends of 
Figure 6. Zambia’s lead production in tons. 
Source: Authors’collation from the computation of data from annual reports of UMHK 1911–1966; 
Gecamines 1967–2016; ZCCM 1928–2015 and USG database 1933–2016.
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nonferrous metals production in the Copperbelt region relative to the 
international experience.
4 Discussion
In this article, we analysed the role of the Copperbelt in the world 
market for nonferrous metals. This section discusses the production trends 
of the five nonferrous metals in the Copperbelt relative to Chile and Peru. 
It is divided into four periods: the colonial era, nationalization, 
privatization, and the joint venture partnership with Chinese investors. We 
aimed to shed light on the contribution of the Copperbelt to the global 
markets of nonferrous metals. Since the early 1990s, China has been 
experiencing rapid economic growth, which requires a stable supply of 
metals to satisfy the domestic consumption of minerals and sustain its 
industrialization. 
During the late nineteenth century, following the Berlin conference of 
1885, European powers divided Africa into colonies under their control. 
The development of the Copperbelt has experienced challenges for both 
foreign investors and local workers. When the colonial British came into 
contact with the native people in Zambia, they did little or nothing for 
them, providing social services that were inadequate and imposing heavy 
taxation (Keith, 1937), thus obliging the native miners to work to pay their 
taxes (Spearpoint, 1937). In the Belgian Congo, similar working conditions 
have been implemented in the Katanga Copperbelt (Dibwe, 2001), resulting 
in industrial Katanga becoming known as the “land of death” due to 
hazardous working conditions in the copper industry (Russo, 2002). 
Industrial accidents in the copper mines of Katanga were more frequent 
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than in Zambia (Kalenga, Balyahamwabo, & Takai, 2016). During the early 
years of industrial production, the Copperbelt regions of Zambia and the 
DRC entered a phase of phenomenal mining expansion that created an 
insatiable demand for African labour to meet the increasing needs for 
metals (Kalusa, 2011).
During the colonial period, European multinationals provided most of the 
investment and managerial expertise and had exclusive control of the 
industry. The return on investment essentially compensated the investors, 
although a small share of the income helped to maintain the basic 
infrastructure and local labour force needed to continue the exploitation 
(Dumett, 1985). The living standards of miners in mining towns were 
higher than those in traditional villages. The role of the Copperbelt in 
contributing to the world output of cadmium and zinc was insignificant 
because it produced a total of less than 3% of these metals. The processing 
of zinc as a by-product of copper did not attract the investment needed to 
develop the appropriate processing facilities. Also, the DRC and Zambia 
accounted for 3% and 0.2% of cadmium output respectively. Moreover, the 
relatively low price of these by-products on the world market might have 
harmed the development of extraction and processing.
The cobalt market is highly concentrated; the DRC, the leading producer 
and reserve holder, accounts for two-thirds of the world production. The 
three African producers, including the DRC, Zambia, and Morocco, 
together account for about 82% of the world’s primary production (Klass, 
Burrows, & Beggs, 1980). In 1964, soon after the independence of Zambia, 
the government decided to nationalize the multinational corporations to 
boost economic development (Libby & Woakes, 1980). Following 
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independence, the mining industry in Zambia was unable to generate 
sufficient income to initiate the production process (O'Faircheallaigh, 1986). 
Becoming aware of the failing copper industry, the government changed its 
policy to, once again, depend on foreign funding to finance its economic 
growth (Burdette, 1984).
From 1967 to 1992, the government officials of the DRC and Zambia 
thought that taking control of the major copper industry would support 
national sovereignty. The nationalization of mines and industrial plants 
would enable them to finance the countries’ economic development 
projects. The production levels of copper metal increased from their 
colonial period median of 140,000 and 259,000 to 426,000 and 573,000 in the 
DRC and Zambia, respectively. These quantities accounted for a share of 
6% and 8% of the total world production of copper. In contrast, the output 
of cobalt metal decreased from its levels of 58% and 10% in the DRC and 
Zambia to 48% and 8% respectively. The share of zinc and cadmium as a 
proportion of the total world production remained negligible throughout the 
nationalization period.
This transition period allowed the Zambian and Congolese government 
officials to determine adequate compensation in favour of the nationalized 
mining companies’ shareholders. In Katanga, president Mobutu6） passed the 
nationalization law of January 2, 1967, that transferred the mines and 
metallurgical plants of the Union Minière du Haut-Katanga to the 
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6） Mobutu Sese Seko was born on October 14, 1930, Lisala, Belgian Congo-died on September 
7, 1997, in Rabat, Morocco. He was president of the Democratic Republic of Congo which he 
renamed Zaire from 1971-1997. As political and military leader, he seized power in a 1965 
coup and ruled for some 32 years before being ousted in a rebellion in 1997.
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government as a sole owner of a newly-formed company named Gecamines 
(Saquet, 2000). In Zambia, on December 24, 1969, President Kenneth 
Kaunda passed the nationalization law that transferred ownership of the 
copper mines and plants of the Zambia Anglo-American group and the Roan 
Selection Trust Limited group, with the government taking 51% ownership 
of the ZCCM (Fraser & Larmer, 2010). In both countries, these policies 
aimed to secure control of the major industries to finance the governments’ 
economic development projects.
In developing countries, the nationalization of multinational companies 
operating in the natural resource sector has been an issue of considerable 
debate. Mtegha et al. argued that nationalization in the Copperbelt, as well 
as the Southern African Development Community (SADEC) region, aimed 
to achieve both political and economic goals (Mtegha, Cawood, & Minnitt, 
2006). Fleming found that nationalization policies in the developing 
countries are motivated by increasingly economic self-reliance in order to 
reduce the excessive external economic dependence that impedes real 
economic and social progress (Fleming, 1973). Therefore, the host country 
should develop the ability to carry out production and fulfil its sales 
obligation before nationalizing foreign companies. Ericsson found that the 
world mining crisis of the 1970s was amplified by the economic slowdown in 
economic development of the third world countries (Ericsson, 1991). 
Figure 7 compares the copper metal production trends of the Copperbelt, 
Chile, Peru and the world.
The comparison of the nationalization policy in the Copperbelt and Chile 
resulted in the increase of production in Chile while a decrease of 
production was experienced in the Copperbelt. Chile is the largest producer 
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of copper metal in the world, accounting for one-fourth of the total world 
production since the fiscal year 2000. Peru has significantly increased its 
copper production, becoming the second single producer of the red metal in 
2000. When the country nationalized its copper industry, Chile increased its 
production of copper from 657,000 tons recorded before the nationalization 
in 1968, to 1,050,000 tons in 1977. In the case of Zambia, Libby et al. found 
that nationalization raised serious doubts regarding its suitability as a policy 
for controlling the economy. The Zambian output has declined from 
720,000 metric tons in 1969, which was the year of nationalization, to 
658,000 tons in 1977 (Libby & Woakes, 1980). In the case of the DRC, the 
output rose from 321,000 metric tons in 1967, the year of nationalization, 
to 450,000 tons in 1977 (Kalenga, 2014). In 1967, the nationalization of the 
UMHK was the turning point in the history of the company’s management 
Figure 7. Comparison of copper metal production. 
Source: Authors’ collation from the computation of data from annual reports of UMHK 1911–1966; 
Gecamines 1967–2016; ZCCM 1928–2015; and the US geological database 1932–2016.
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(Kovar, 1967). Following nationalization, a lack of expertise among the 
decision-makers in the DRC resulted in undervaluation of state-owned 
assets. This practice constrained the country’s ability to generate an 
effective return from the mining sector.
The Copperbelt increased its copper output reaching a peak of 16% of the 
total world mine production during the period under consideration. Until 
2012, Zambia was the largest producer of copper metal in Africa, followed 
by the DRC, which has held the leading position since 2013 onward. The 
first international copper cartel, established in 1935, terminated 
prematurely with the beginning of World War II (Walters, 1944). Although 
Zambia and the DRC, as the major African producers, joined the second 
international copper cartel in 1967, their influence on the world price of the 
copper metal was ineffective because of the sudden decline in demand for 
the red metal. Also, in Zambia and the DRC, the previous owners 
maintained the technical production power and commercial networks, but 
African executives could produce metals for exportation to the world 
market.
American, British, and Belgian owners, who lost their exclusive control 
of mines and industrial plants after the nationalization, reacted by seeking 
an embargo on exports of copper to the world market (Lasaga, 1981). 
These owners immediately benefited from the solidarity of the principal 
buyers and brokers on the world market. However, a few months later, 
some European consumers resumed buying the red metal from the regions 
with nationalized copper mines. Rapid economic development leads to high 
demand for metals to build infrastructure and facilitate the industrialization 
process. From 1994 onwards, the increased Chinese appetite for zinc 
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resulted in China becoming the largest producer and consumer of 
nonferrous metals. Figure 8 compares the share of the Copperbelt, Chile, 
Peru and the world market of lead.
Figure 8 shows that the quantity of lead produced in tons was 
insignificant in the Copperbelt, as well as in Chile and Peru, representing a 
tiny share of the world market for nonferrous metals. The same trend was 
observed for cadmium production in the Copperbelt relative to the world 
market. The DRC and Zambia play minor roles in the world market for 
cadmium metal for the entire period under study. The output of cadmium 
was insignificant in the world market. Furthermore, the trend of zinc 
Figure 8. Comparison of lead production in Chile, Peru, the Copperbelt, and the world. 
Source: Authors’ collation from the computation of data from annual reports of UMHK 1911–1966; 
Gecamines 1967–2016; ZCCM 1928–2015; and the US geological database 1932–2016.
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output in the Copperbelt accounted for less than 2% of the total world 
production. Figure 9 depicts the world’s major consuming countries of the 
electrolytic copper from 1926 to 2015. 
Figure 9 shows that the USA was the largest consumer of electrolytic 
copper metal until 2003, after which China became the world’s largest 
Figure 9. Consumption of electrolytic copper in tons in China, the USA, and Japan in metric tons. 
Source: Authors’ calculation using data from the US geology reports 1931–2018.
Table 2.  Summary of electrolytic copper consumption in the USA, Japan, and 
China in tons 1926–2015.
Country USA copper use in tons Japan copper use in tons China copper use in tons
Mean 1682.48 737.64 5467.75
Median 1760.00 820.00 5005.50
Mode 1760.00 52.00 N/A
SD 621.91 565.01 2397.60
Kurtosis -0.25 -1.63 -0.85
Skewness -0.20 0.07 0.66
Minimum 111.00 22.00 2736.00
Maximum 3020.00 1710.00 9830.00
Sum 149741.00 65650.00 65613.00
Observations 89.00 89.00 12.00
Source: Authors’ collation from the computation of data from Stata Software.
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producer and consumer of electrolytic copper. Table 2 summarizes the 
quantities of electrolytic copper consumed in three countries in tons.
Table 2 shows that the USA has been the leading consumer of 
electrolytic copper metal with the median value of 1,760,000 tons, which is 
double of Japan reaching 802,000 tons for the entire period, while China 
accounted for 5,000,000 tons during the last decade. Although the demand 
for copper metal has been increasing on the global market, the government 
policies implemented in the Copperbelt region did not equally distribute the 
income from the copper industry to local people. The Kofi Annan Report of 
2013 found that the DRC lost US$ 1.36 billion in five mining deals as a 
result of the alleged undervaluation over the period between 2010 and 2012 
(Chan & Rowley, 2013). The case of the DRC better illustrates the high 
cost associated with opaque concession trading than any other country in 
the world. Indeed, reducing the actual value of concessions raises debate 
on the real intention of undervaluing the country’s assets when granting the 
mining concessions. One reason would be the lack of expertise to 
accurately conduct the prospection and evaluation of ore deposits. In this 
regard, the Congolese government failed to play an important role in 
financing prospection projects to produce an accurate database of all 
national resources. Another reason could be secret agreements intended to 
attract bribes in mining operations.
The effect of opaque concession trading was that individuals became 
powerful and wealthy. At the same time, the public institutions lacked the 
budgets to finance development projects, despite the intention of 
nationalization supposedly being to redistribute the mining revenue to the 
population. This practice perpetuated the local people’s poverty and misery 
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because they were excluded from the redistribution of national income. The 
mining towns and cities created around the production centres in the 
Copperbelt region witnessed a deterioration of living standards because the 
exploitation of metals enriched only the ruling class and neglected their 
fellow citizens. The situation became even worse during the nationalization 
period than it had been in the colonial era. Negi found that, in the North-
western Province of Zambia, many towns did not have access to running 
water, electrical power, paved roads, or decent schools for preparing the 
next generation for a satisfactory life (Negi, 2011).
The gross per capita domestic product (GDP)7) in both Zambia and the 
DRC stagnated despite all political attempts to increase the living standards 
of the natives beyond the levels of the 1960s. In 1960, the per capita GDP 
was higher in Belgian Congo than Zambia. After 1985, the per capita GDP 
of Zambia exceeded that of the DRC. Since 2006, Zambia has achieved a per 
capita GDP of over 1000 dollars per person, while the DRC has become one 
of the poorest countries, at less than 500 dollars per year. Per capita GDP 
measures the market value of goods and services that can be bought on the 
market. The economist Parkin argues that GDP might be misleading in 
some cases. Indeed, some of the factors that influence the standard of 
living are not part of GDP, including household production, underground 
economic activity, leisure time, and environmental quality (Parkin, 2016). 
The informal sector has become the main source of income for most of the 
population in Zambia and the DRC.
7) Gross domestic product (GDP) is one of the main measures of economic activity. The GDP of 
a country is defined as the total market value of all final goods and services produced within a 
country in a given period of time or a calendar year.
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The mines’ production of cobalt and copper in the DRC and Zambia does 
not necessarily translate into a better standard of living for people who 
claim to possess the rights to natural resources. When China started its 
business in Africa, it stressed a policy of non-intervention in Africa 
emphasizing not attach conditionalities to its foreign investment and aid 
(Bush, 2008). China has increased its production and consumption of metals 
for economic development. However, if appropriate management policy is 
not implemented, the “resource curse” will keep the Copperbelt region 
within a trap. Consequently, the producing countries in this region will 
continue to passively witness the depletion of their minerals, without any 
redistribution policy to change current trends. Kalenga found that the 
democratization of political systems in the region, beginning in the early 
1990s, brought new hope to citizens, who believed that the income from the 
exploitation of mineral resources would overcome the pre judice 
experienced since nationalization (Kalenga, 2013). The governments of the 
two countries simultaneously engaged in the privatisation of the mines from 
1992 to 2002. Privatisation is an umbrella term8), and the decision to 
privatise usually involves financial gain, with governments selling state-
owned enterprises to obtain proceeds either for short-term budget 
balancing or to pay debts (Henderson, 2008). Lungu argued that 
privatisation policies did not generate the expected revenue to finance the 
economic development in Zambia (Lungu, 2008).
During the colonial and nationalization periods, the DRC and Zambia 
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8) Privatisation broadly means the shift of some or all of the responsibility for a function from 
government to the private sector. The common motivation for engaging in any type of 
privatisation is to substitute more efficient business operations for what are seen as less 
efficient, bureaucratic, and often politicized operations in the public sector.
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supplied 60% and 11% of cobalt metal to the world market, respectively 
(Nyembo, 1975). The median value of copper metal production accounted 
for 32,000 metric tons and 315,000 metric tons in the DRC and Zambia, 
respectively. At the beginning of the privatisation, the DRC’s cobalt metal 
output was at the lowest level of 3500 tons, representing 12.9% of the 
world’s total production period, while Zambia was at the peak of 5900 tons, 
accounting for 25% of the world’s total production. The collapse of the 
mines’ production of copper and cobalt was a result of both domestic and 
external factors, especially the political instability that followed the end of 
the communist regimes and the formation of multiparty democracy. The 
Copperbelt region disappeared from the world market as a supplier of 
nonferrous metals. Kippin argued that the crisis at Gecamines in the 1990s 
reinforced the poverty cycle for the Congolese population (Kippin, 2008). 
The extensive cobalt and copper reserves within the region continued to 
attract foreign investment to meet the world demand for these strategic 
metals.
During the early 1990s, the production of minor metals, such as cadmium 
and zinc, ceased completely because of the collapse of metal production, 
including copper and cobalt. Although Zambia maintained its production of 
copper, it is surprising to notice the country’s entire zinc metal production 
nevertheless collapsed. A closer observation of the production of zinc and 
cobalt metals shows a similarity in the behaviour of these two producing 
countries. The government policies relating to the copper industry in the 
two countries have been influenced by international financial organizations. 
The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) advised 
African government officials to privatise the state-owned enterprises to 
improve their competitiveness on the global market and to guarantee the 
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borrowing of funds from the financial markets. The prospect of changing 
the Zambian copper industry from state-owned to privatised was proposed 
in a working report that the World Bank-funded in 1994 (Craig, 2001). 
However, Pitcher found that privatisation was a key element in the effort to 
expand black ownership of businesses enacted by the post-apartheid 
government in South Africa (Pitcher, 2012). 
The decade from 2000 to 2015 witnessed a particular form of partnership 
with Chinese investors. When resources are scarce for the individual, they 
are also scarce for the economy as a whole. An economy has an abundance 
of different resources that can be combined in all kinds of ways to produce a 
myriad of goods and services. The nature of Chinese relations with Africa, 
especially in the Copperbelt region, changed due to the increase in its need 
for minerals in the early 2000s (to meet the high demand for nonferrous 
metals in the context of rapid economic growth). China is rich in mineral 
resources, leading in the world’s tungsten and antimony reserves. Coal 
mining was the principal mineral industry in pre-war China (Wang, 1944). 
However, nonferrous metals are indispensable raw materials for economic 
development, and demand for these metals increases concurrently with the 
rate of economic growth (Sun & Sun, 2017). From 2009 onwards, China 
became the largest producer and consumer of the six major nonferrous 
metals: copper, aluminium, zinc, lead, nickel, and tin (Farooki & 
Kaplinsky, 2012). Between 1996 and 2008, the domestic output of ten 
nonferrous metals increased five-fold, of which copper, aluminium, lead, 
and zinc increased nearly four-, eight-, six-, and four-times respectively 
(Ren & Hu, 2012). In addition to the domestic supply, China launched 
foreign mining projects in the Central African Copperbelt, focusing on the 
extraction and importation of cobalt, copper, and zinc. 
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In the DRC, the production of these metals, which are used in batteries, 
did not recover as quickly as that of the principal metals. In 2012, a new 
plant was under construction at the Kipushi mine to extract and process 
zinc metal exclusively. The economic impact of mine production on local 
communities has been almost non-existent since independence. Clark 
observed similar effects in Asia (Clark, 2001). However, the important 
reserves of copper and cobalt attracted both human capital, Western 
technology, and entrepreneurship to maximize the extraction and 
processing of metals in the Copperbelt (Fetter, 1992). Also, many cities and 
towns were created during the colonial period to attract and settle a 
workforce from distant locations of Africa in the Copperbelt region. These 
cities improved the living conditions by reducing mortality and increasing 
the productivity of African workers (Fetter, 2001). The privatisation of 
mines, especially the recent Chinese investment, has extended the 
production possibilities in both Zambia and the DRC. In 2014, the mines’ 
production reached its historical peak levels of 1,000,000 tons of copper 
metal and 100,000 tons of cobalt metal, respectively. In the twenty-first 
century, the innovation of electric vehicles, artificial intelligence, robots, 
and electronic devices with rechargeable batteries will steadily increase the 
demand for nonferrous metals. The Copperbelt will continue to play a key 
role in the world market for nonferrous metals.
5 Conclusion
In this article, we have explored the growth of extractive industries in 
the Copperbelt focusing on those processing the nonferrous metals. Using 
the primary archives of the main producing companies in Zambia and the 
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DRC, we argue that the Copperbelt produced the median value of 50% of 
cobalt, 12% of copper, 3.2% of zinc, 1.8% of cadmium, and 0.6% of lead as 
the total share of the total world production. In comparison, Chile and Peru 
accounted for 13% and 3% of copper, respectively.
The colonial period was characterized by the introduction of European 
capital, technology, and human expertise to develop the copper industry. 
Following independence, the different policies adopted by Zambia and the 
DRC failed to generate the revenues needed to finance the economic 
development of these countries. Nationalization policies, government 
interference, political instability, combined with the mismanagement of 
resources in the early 1990s, resulted in the collapse of the copper industry 
in Zambia and the DRC. In fact, ZCCM maintained its industrial plants at a 
low production level, but the situation was so severe at Gecamines that the 
company closed its principal processing plants.
When Zambia and the DRC were dealing with the copper industry crisis, 
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund advised the Sub-
Saharan governments to adopt radical privatisation policies, changing their 
state-owned firms from public ownership to private ownership to attract 
foreign investment and human expertise. In 1992, the government officials 
privatised Zambian copper mining to make it more competitive. In the 
DRC, government officials decided on a semi-privatised joint-venture 
partnership of state-owned companies with private entities, resulting in 
Gecamines signing joint-venture contracts with foreign investors. These 
foreign investors assumed most of the ownership and management control 
of the mines. The management of the mining industry in Africa illustrates 
the complexity of balancing the expectations of all stakeholders.
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Mineral exploitation in developing countries is usually a competition on 
two fronts: international and domestic. In the first case, multinational 
companies exert tremendous and overarching pressures on the leaders of 
developing countries. Usually, this pressure is irresistible and unavoidable, 
given the unequal financial relations between the third world countries and 
the multinationals. On the domestic front, the bourgeois elites fight it out 
with the masses, who remain poor amid abundant natural resources. Both 
emerging and developed economies need a stable supply of nonferrous 
metals to build their infrastructures and maintain high lighting 
manufacturing, so the world demand for copper and cobalt will continue to 
increase. Within the Copperbelt region, the North-western province in 
Zambia and the Lualaba province in the DRC should play pivotal roles as 
suppliers of cobalt and copper metals.
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